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For many years, Chomsky himself refused to speculate about this matter, stating that evolutionary theoryhas little to say, as of now, about questions of this nature (1988:167). Other theorists have not been so reticent, and a large literature has grown up in which the selective advantages of having a language are adumbrated. LINGUIST 167 Acdsee photo studio 5 1 1130 download free. Languages of the World. GER:DB-SocSci, WAY-ED: The diversity of human languages, their sound systems, vocabularies, and grammars. Tracing historical relationships between languages and language families. Parallels with genetic evolutionary theory. Please email Melinda at waysofthinking@stanford.edu. In Proceedings of the 48th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 167-176. Uppsala, Sweden: Association for Computational Linguistics. bibtex; code and data Munro, Robert, Steven Bethard, Victor Kuperman, Vicky Tzuyin Lai, Robin Melnick, Christopher Potts, Tyler Schnoebelen, and Harry Tily. Languages of the World. Split Images: A Century of Cinema. Stanford, CA Phone: 650-498-2931. Thu Jan 20 2005 Books: Discourse Analysis/Pragmatics/Socioling: Kendon
Editor for this issue: Megan Zdrojkowskimeganlinguistlist.org Directory
1. JoyceReid,Gesture: Kendon
Message 1: Gesture: Kendon Date: 18-Jan-2005
From: Joyce Reid jreidcup.org
Subject: Gesture: Kendon
Title: Gesture
Subtitle: Visible Action as Utterance
Published: 2004
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
http://www.cup.org
Linguist 167 Stanford University Book URL: http://us.cambridge.org/titles/0521835259
Author: Adam Kendon, University of Pennsylvania
Hardback: ISBN: 0521835259 Pages: 410 Price: U.K. 50.00
Hardback: ISBN: 0521835259 Pages: 410 Price: U.S. $ 90.00
Hardback: ISBN: 0521835259 Pages: 410 Price: AUS $ 180.00 Comment: price inclusive of GST
Abstract:
Gesture, or visible bodily action that is seen as intimately involved in
the activity of speaking, has long fascinated scholars and laymen alike.
Written by a leading authority on the subject, this long-awaited study
provides a comprehensive treatment of gesture and its use in interaction,
drawing on the analysis of everyday conversations to demonstrate its varied
role in the construction of utterances. Adam Kendon accompanies his
analyses with an extended discussion of the history of the study of gesture
- a topic not dealt with in any previous publication - as well as exploring
the relationship between gesture and sign language, and how the use of
gesture varies according to cultural and language differences. Set to
become the definitive account of the topic, Gesture will be invaluable to
all those interested in human communication. Its publication marks a major
development, both in semiotics and in the emerging field of gesture studies.
1. The domain of gesture
2. Visible action as gesture
3. Western interest in gesture from classical antiquity to the eighteenth
century
4. Four contributions from the nineteenth century: Andrea de Jorio, Edward
Tylor, Garrick Mallery and Wilhelm Wundt
5. Gesture studies in the twentieth century: recession and return
6. Classifying gestures
7. Gesture units, gesture phrases and speech
8. Deployments of gesture in the utterance
9. Gesture and speech in semantic interaction
10. Gesture and referential meaning
11. On pointing
12. Gestures of the 'precision-grip': topic, comment and question markers
13. Two gesture families of the open hand
14. Gesture without speech: the emergence of kinesic codes
15. Gesture and sign on common ground
16. Gesture, culture and the communication economy
17. The status of gesture
Appendix I. Transcription conventions
Appendix II. The recordings.
Linguistic Field(s):Discourse Analysis
History of Linguistics
Pragmatics
Semantics
Sociolinguistics
Written In: English (ENG )
See this book announcement on our website:
http://linguistlist.org/get-book.html?BookID=12972
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First published Mon Mar 3, 2003; substantive revision Mon Sep 17, 2018
Hans-Georg Gadamer is the decisive figure in the development oftwentieth century hermeneuticsalmost certainly eclipsing, interms of influence and reputation, the other leading figures,including Paul Ricoeur, and also Gianni Vattimo (Vattimo was himselfone of Gadamers students). Trained in neo-Kantian scholarship, aswell as in classical philology, and profoundly affected by thephilosophy of Martin Heidegger, Gadamer developed a distinctive andthoroughly dialogical approach, grounded in Platonic-Aristotelian aswell as Heideggerian thinking, that rejects subjectivism andrelativism, abjures any simple notion of interpretive method, andgrounds understanding in the linguistically mediated happening oftradition. Employing a more orthodox and modest, but also moreaccessible style than Heidegger himself, Gadamers work can be seen asconcentrated in four main areas: the first, and clearly the mostinfluential, is the development and elaboration of a philosophicalhermeneutics; the second is the dialogue within philosophy, and withinthe history of philosophy, with respect to Plato and Aristotle inparticular, but also with Hegel and Heidegger; the third is theengagement with literature, particularly poetry, and with art; and thefourth is what Gadamer himself terms practicalphilosophy (Gadamer 2001, 7885) encompassing contemporarypolitical and ethical issues. The dialogical characterof Gadamers approach is evident, not merely in the centraltheoretical role he gives to the concept of dialogue in his thinking,but also in the discursive and dialogic, evenconversational, character of his writing, as well as inhis own personal commitment to intellectual engagement andexchange. Indeed, he is one of the few philosophers for whom theinterview has become a significant category ofphilosophical output (see Hahn 1997, 588599; also Gadamer 2001,2003). Although he identified connections between his own work andEnglish-speaking analytic thought (mainly via the laterWittgenstein, but also Donald Davidson), and has sometimes seen hisideas taken up by thinkers such as Alasdair McIntyre (see MacIntyre2002), Ronald Dworkin (see Dworkin 1986), Robert Brandom (see Brandom2002), John McDowell (see McDowell 1996, 2002), and especially RichardRorty (Rorty 1979), Gadamer is perhaps less well known, and certainlyless well-appreciated, in philosophical circles outside Europe thanare some of his near-contemporaries. He is undoubtedly, however, oneof the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, having had anenormous impact on a range of areas from aesthetics to jurisprudence,and having acquired a respect and reputation in Germany, and elsewherein Europe, that went far beyond the usual confines of academia.
2. Hermeneutical Foundations
3. Philosophical Hermeneutics
Bibliography 1. Biographical Sketch
Wolf responsive form maker 2 37 1080p. Image software free mac . Born on February 11, 1900, in Marburg, in Southern Germany,Gadamer grew up in Breslau (now Wroclaw in Poland), where his fatherwas Professor of Pharmacy at the University of Breslau, later takingthe Chair of Pharmaceutical Chemistry at Marburg. Gadamers familybackground was Protestant, and his father was sternly Prussian. Hismother died of diabetes when Gadamer was only four, and he had nosurviving brothers or sisters. Motion 5 4 mac crack full download . Showing an early interest in humanisticstudies, Gadamer began university studies in Breslau in 1918 (studyingwith Richard Hoenigswald), moving to Marburg with his father in1919. Gadamer completed his doctoral studies at Marburg in 1922 (inhis own words, too youngsee Gadamer 1997b, 7)with a dissertation on Plato. In that same year, Gadamer alsocontracted poliomyelitis, from which he recovered only slowly, and theafter-effects of which remained with him for the rest of his life.
Gadamers early teachers at Marburg were Paul Natorp and NicolaiHartmann. Paul Friedlander introduced him to philological study, andGadamer also received encouragement from Rudolf Bultmann. It was,however, Martin Heidegger (at Marburg from 19231928) who exerted themost important and enduring effect on Gadamers philosophicaldevelopment. Gadamer had first met Heidegger in Frieburg in early1923, having also corresponded with him in 1922. Yet although Gadamerwas a key figure in Heideggers Marburg circle, working as Heideggersunpaid assistant, by 1925 Heidegger had became quite critical ofGadamers philosophical capacities and contributions. As a result,Gadamer decided to abandon philosophy for classicalphilology. (Gadamer was not alone in being the recipient of suchcriticismHeidegger was also unimpressed by Jacob Klein and wascertainly prone to deliver harsh judgments on his students andcolleaguesbut Gadamer seems to have been more particularlyaffected by it.) Through his philological work, however, Gadamer seemsto have regained Heideggers respect, passing the State Examination inClassical Philology in 1927, with Friedlander and Heidegger as two ofthe three examiners, and then going on to submit his habilitationdissertation (Platos Dialectical Ethics, [1991]), in1928, under Friedlander and Heideggers guidance. Gadamersrelationship with Heidegger remained relatively close throughout theirrespective careers, even though it was also a relationship that heldconsiderable tensionat least on Gadamers side.
Gadamers first academic appointment was to a junior position inMarburg in 1928, finally achieving a lower-level professorship therein 1937. In the meantime, from 193435, Gadamer held a temporaryprofessorship at Kiel, and then, in 1939, took up the Directorship ofthe Philosophical Institute at the University of Leipzig, becomingDean of the Faculty in 1945, and Rector in 1946, before returning toteaching and research at Frankfurt-am-Main in 1947. In 1949, hesucceeded Karl Jaspers at Heidelberg, officially retiring (becomingProfessor Emeritus) in 1968. Following his retirement, he travelledextensively, spending considerable time in North America, where he wasa visitor at a number of institutions and developed an especiallyclose and regular association with Boston College inMassachusetts.
During the 1930s and 1940s, Gadamer was able to accommodate himself,on his account, reluctantly, first to National Socialism and thenbriefly, to Communism. While Gadamer did not identify himself stronglywith either regime (he was never a member of the National SocialistParty, although he did belong to the affiliated National SocialistTeachers Union), neither did he draw attention to himself by outrightopposition. However some have seen his stance as too acquiescent, andothers have argued that he was indeed supportive of the Nazidictatorship or of some aspects of it (see Wolin 2000 as well as thereply in Palmer 2002; see also the discussion in Krejewski 2003,169306; for Gadamers own comments on this issue, seeGadamer 2001).
In 1953, together with Helmut Kuhn, Gadamer founded the highlyinfluential Philosophische Rundschau , but his mainphilosophical impact was not felt until the publication of Truthand Method in 1960 (1989b). Gadamers best knownpublications almost all date from the period after Truth andMethod , and in this respect much of his philosophical reputationrests on publications either after or in the decade just before histransition to emeritus status (in 1968). The important debates inwhich Gadamer engaged with Emilio Betti, Jrgen Habermas andJacques Derrida all took place in this latter part of Gadamersphilosophical career, and the translation of his work into Englishalso began only quite late, in the 1970s. Linguist 1 Stanford
Gadamer was twice married: in 1923, to Frida Kratz (later divorced),with whom he had one daughter (born in 1926), and, in 1950, toKte Lekebusch. Gadamer received numerous awards and prizesincluding, in 1971, Knight of the Order ofMeritthe highest academic honor awarded inGermany. Remaining intellectually active until the very end of hislife (he held regular office hours even in his nineties), Gadamer diedin Heidelberg on March 13, 2002, at the age of 102. Linguist 167 Stanford Ave 2. Hermeneutical Foundations 2.1 Dialogue and Phronesis
Gadamers thinking began and always remained connected with Greekthought, especially that of Plato and Aristotle. In this respect,Gadamers early engagement with Plato, which lay at the core of bothhis doctoral and habilitation dissertations, was determinative of muchof the character and philosophical direction of his thinking. Underthe influence of his early teachers such as Hartmann, as well asFriedlander, Gadamer developed an approach to Plato that rejected theidea of any hidden doctrine in Platos thought, lookinginstead to the structure of the Platonic dialogues themselves as thekey to understanding Platos philosophy. The only way to understandPlato, as Gadamer saw it, was thus by working through the Platonictexts in a way that not only enters into the dialogue and dialecticset out in those texts, but also repeats that dialogic movement in theattempt at understanding as such. Moreover, the dialectical structureof Platonic questioning also provides the model for a way ofunderstanding that is open to the matter at issue through bringingoneself into question along with the matter itself. Under theinfluence of Heidegger, Gadamer also took up, as a central element inhis thinking, the idea of phronesis (practicalwisdom) that appears in Book VI of Aristotles NichomacheanEthics . For Heidegger the concept of phronesis isimportant, not only as a means of giving emphasis to our practicalbeing-in-the world over and against theoreticalapprehension, but it can additionally be seen as constituting a modeof insight into our own concrete situation (both our practicalsituation and, more fundamentally, our existential situation, hence phronesis constitutes a mode of self-knowledge). The way inwhich Gadamer conceives of understanding, and interpretation, is asjust such a practically oriented mode of insighta mode ofinsight that has its own rationality irreducible to any simple rule orset of rules, that cannot be directly taught, and that is alwaysoriented to the particular case at hand. The concept of phronesis can itself be seen as providing a certainelaboration of the dialogic conception of understanding Gadamer hadalready found in Plato. Taken together, phronesis anddialogue provide the essential starting point for the development ofGadamers philosophical hermeneutics. 2.2 Ontology and Hermeneutics
Traditionally, hermeneutics is taken to have its origins in problemsof biblical exegesis and in the development of a theoretical frameworkto govern and direct such exegetical practice. In the hands ofeighteenth and early nineteenth century theorists, writers such asChladenius and Meier, Ast and Schleiermacher, hermeneutics wasdeveloped into a more encompassing theory of textual interpretation ingenerala set of rules that provide the basis for good interpretivepractice no matter what the subject matter. Inasmuch as hermeneuticsis the method proper to the recovery of meaning, so Wilhelm Diltheybroadened hermeneutics still further, taking it as the methodology forthe recovery of meaning that is essential to understanding within thehuman or historical sciences (the Geisteswissenschaften ). For these writers, as for manyothers, the basic problem of hermeneutics was methodological: how tofound the human sciences, and so how to found the science ofinterpretation, in a way that would make them properlyscientific. Moreover, if the mathematical models andprocedures that appeared to be the hallmark of the sciences of naturecould not be duplicated in the human sciences, then the task at issuemust involve finding an alternative methodology proper to the humansciences as suchhence Schleiermachers ambition to develop aformal methodology that would codify interpretive practice, whileDilthey aimed at the elaboration of a psychology thatwould elucidate and guide interpretive understanding.
Already familiar with earlier hermeneutic thinking, Heideggerredeployed hermeneutics to a very different purpose and within a verydifferent frame. In Heideggers early thinking, particularly thelectures from the early 1920s (The Hermeneutics of Facticity),hermeneutics is presented as that by means of which the investigationof the basic structures of factical existence is to be pursuednotas that which constitutes a theory of textualinterpretation nor a method of scientific understanding,but rather as that which allows the self-disclosure of the structureof understanding as such. The hermeneutic circle thathad been a central idea in previous hermeneutic thinking, and that hadbeen viewed in terms of the interpretative interdependence, within anymeaningful structure, between the parts of that structure and thewhole, was transformed by Heidegger, so that it was now seen asexpressing the way in which all understanding was alwaysalready given over to that which is to be understood (tothe things themselves die Sachenselbst ). Thus, to take a simple example, if we wish tounderstand some particular artwork, we already need to have some priorunderstanding of that work (even if only as a set of paint marks oncanvas), otherwise it cannot even be seen as something to beunderstood. To put the point more generally, and in more basicontological terms, if we are to understand anything at all, we mustalready find ourselves in the world alongwith that which is to be understood. All understanding that isdirected at the grasp of some particular subject matter is thus basedin a prior ontological understandinga priorhermeneutical situatedness. On this basis, hermeneutics can beunderstood as the attempt to make explicit the structureof such situatedness. Yet since that situatedness is indeed prior toany specific event of understanding, so it must always be presupposedeven in the attempt at its own explication. Consequently, theexplication of this situatednessof this basic ontological mode ofunderstandingis essentially a matter of exhibiting orlaying-bare a structure with which we are alreadyfamiliar (the structure that is present in every event ofunderstanding), and, in this respect, hermeneutics becomes one withphenomenology, itself understood, in Heideggers thinking, as justsuch a laying bare.
It is hermeneutics, in this Heideggerian and phenomenological sense,that is taken up in Gadamers work, and that leads him, in conjunctionwith certain other insights from Heideggers later thinking, as well asthe ideas of dialogue and practical wisdom, to elaborate aphilosophical hermeneutics that provides an account of the nature ofunderstanding in its universality (where this refers both to theontologically fundamental character of the hermeneutical situation andthe all-encompassing nature of hermeneutic practice) and, in theprocess, to develop a response to the earlier hermeneutic traditionspreoccupation with the problem of interpretive method. In theserespects, Gadamers work, in conjunction with that of Heidegger,represents a radical reworking of the idea of hermeneutics thatconstitutes a break with the preceding hermeneutical tradition, and yetalso reflects back on that tradition. Gadamer thus develops aphilosophical hermeneutics that provides an account of the properground for understanding, while nevertheless rejecting the attempt,whether in relation to the Geisteswissenschaften or elsewhere,to found understanding on any method or set of rules. This is not arejection of the importance of methodological concerns, but rather aninsistence on the limited role of method and the priority ofunderstanding as a dialogic, practical, situated activity. 2.3 Aesthetics and Subjectivism
In 1936 Heidegger gave three lectures on The Origin of the Workof Art. In these lectures, not published until 1950, Heideggerconnects art with truth, arguing that the essence of the artwork isnot its representational character, but rather itscapacity to allow the disclosure of a world. Parallelsdesktop 9 0 23036 915397 intelk download free . Thus the Greek templeestablishes the Greek world and in so doing allowsthings to take on a particular appearance within that world. Heideggerrefers to this event of disclosure as the event oftruth. The sense of truth at issue here is one thatHeidegger presents in explicit contrast to what he views as thetraditional concept of truth as correctness. Such correctnessis usually taken to consist in some form of correspondence betweenindividual statements and the world, but so-calledcoherence accounts of truth, according to which truth isa matter of the consistency of a statement with a larger body ofstatements, can also be viewed as based upon the same underlyingnotion of truth as correctness. While Heidegger does notabandon the notion of truth as correctness, he argues that itis derivative of a more basic sense of truth as what he termsunconcealment. Understood in this latter sense, truth isnot a property of statements as they stand in relation to the world,but rather an event or process in and through which both the things ofthe world and what is said about them come to be revealed at one andthe same timethe possibility of correctness arises on thebasis of just such unconcealment.
It is important to recognize, however, that the unconcealment at issueis not a matter of the bringing about of some form of complete andabsolute transparency. The revealing of things is, in fact, alwaysdependent upon other things being simultaneously concealed (in muchthe same way as seeing something in one way depends on not seeing itin another). Truth is thus understood as the unconcealment that allowsthings to appear, and that also makes possible the truth and falsityof individual statements, and yet which arises on the basis of theongoing play between unconcealment and concealmenta playthat, for the most part, remains itself hidden and is never capable ofcomplete elucidation. In the language Heidegger employs in TheOrigin of the Work of Art, the unconcealment ofworld is thereby grounded in the concealment ofearth. It is this sense of truth as the emergence ofthings into unconcealment that occurs on the basis of the play betweenconcealing and unconcealing that is taken by Heidegger as the essence(or origin) of the work of art. This idea of truth, aswell as the poetic language Heidegger employed in his exposition, hada decisive effect on Gadamers own thinking. Indeed, Gadamer describedhis philosophical hermeneutics as precisely an attempt to take up andelaborate this line of thinking from the later Heidegger (Gadamer1997b, 47)
Sound control mac . There are two crucial elements to Gadamers appropriation of Heideggerhere: first, the focus on art, and the connection of art with truth;second, the focus on truth itself as the event of prior and partialdisclosure (or more properly, of concealment/unconcealment) in whichwe are already involved and that can never be made completelytransparent. Both of these elements are connected with Gadamersresponse to the subjectivist and idealist elements in German thoughtthat were present in the neo-Kantian tradition, and, morespecifically, in romantic hermeneutics and aesthetic theory. AsGadamer saw it, aesthetic theory had, largely under the influence ofKant, become alienated from the actual experience of arttheresponse to art had become abstracted andaestheticisedwhile aesthetic judgment had becomepurely a matter of taste, and so of subjective response. Similarly,under the influence of the scientific historiography ofthose such as Ranke, together with the romantic hermeneutics associated withSchleiermacher and others, the desire for objectivity had led to theseparation of historical understanding from the contemporary situationthat motivates it, and to a conception of historical method as basedin the reconstruction of the subjective experiences of theauthora reconstruction that, as Hegel made clear, is surelyimpossible (see Gadamer 1989b, 1649).
By turning back to the direct experience of art, and to the concept oftruth as prior and partial disclosure, Gadamer was able to develop analternative to subjectivism that also connected with the ideas ofdialogue and practical wisdom taken from Plato and Aristotle, and ofhermeneutical situatedness taken from the early Heidegger. Just as theartwork is taken as central and determining in the experience of art,so is understanding similarly determined by the matter to beunderstood; as the experience of art reveals, not in spite of, butprecisely because of the way it also conceals, so understanding ispossible, not in spite of, but precisely because of its priorinvolvement. In Gadamers developed work, the concept ofplay ( Spiel ) has an importantrole here. Gadamer takes play as the basic clue to the ontologicalstructure of art, emphasizing the way in which play is not a form ofdisengaged, disinterested exercise of subjectivity, but is rathersomething that has its own order and structure to which one is givenover. The structure of play has obvious affinities with all of theother concepts at issue hereof dialogue, phronesis , thehermeneutical situation, the truth of art. Indeed, one can take allof these ideas as providing slightly different elaborations of what isessentially the same basic conception of understandingone thattakes our finitude, that is, our prior involvement and partiality, notas a barrier to understanding, but rather as its enablingcondition. It is this conception that is worked out in detail in Truth and Method . 3. Philosophical Hermeneutics 3.1 The Positivity of Prejudice
One might respond to Gadamers emphasis on our prior hermeneuticinvolvement, whether in the experience of art or elsewhere, that suchinvolvement cannot but remain subjective simply on the grounds that itis always determined by our particular dispositions to experiencethings in certain ways rather than othersour involvement, onemight say, is thus always based on subjective prejudice . Suchan objection can be seen as a simple reiteration of the basic tendencytowards subjectivism that Gadamer rejects, but Gadamer also takesissue directly with this view of prejudice and the negativeconnotations often associated with the notion, arguing that, ratherthan closing us off, our prejudices are themselves what open us up towhat is to be understood. In this way Gadamer can be seen asattempting to retrieve a positive conception of prejudice (German Vorurteil ) that goes back to the meaning of the termas literally a pre-judgment (from the Latin prae-judicium ) that was lost during the Renaissance. In Truth and Method , Gadamer redeploys the notion of our priorhermeneutical situatedness as it is worked out in more particularfashion in Heideggers Being and Time (first published in1927) in terms of the fore-structures of understanding, thatis, in terms of the anticipatory structures that allow what is to beinterpreted or understood to be grasped in a preliminary fashion. Thefact that understanding operates by means of such anticipatorystructures means that understanding always involves what Gadamer termsthe anticipation of completenessit alwaysinvolves the revisable presupposition that what is to be understoodconstitutes something that is understandable, that is, something thatis constituted as a coherent, and therefore meaningful, whole.
Gadamers positive conception of prejudice as pre-judgment isconnected with several ideas in his approach to hermeneutics. Theway in which our prejudgments open us up to the matter at issue insuch a way that those prejudgments are themselves capable of beingrevised exhibits the character of the Gadamerian conception ofprejudgment, and its role in understanding, as itself constituting aversion of the hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutical priority Gadamerassigns to prejudgment is also tied to Gadamers emphasis on thepriority of the question in the structure of understandingthelatter emphasis being something Gadamer takes both from Platonicdialectic and also, in Truth and Method , from the work ofR. G. Collingwood. Moreover, the indispensable role of prejudgment inunderstanding connects directly with Gadamers rethinking of thetraditional concept of hermeneutics as necessarily involving, notmerely explication, but also application . In this respect, all interpretation, even of thepast, is necessarily prejudgmental in the sense that it is alwaysoriented to present concerns and interests, and it is those presentconcerns and interests that allow us to enter into the dialogue withthe matter at issue. Here, of course, there is a further connectionwith the Aristotelian emphasis on the practicalnot only isunderstanding a matter of the application of something like practicalwisdom, but it is also always determined by the practical context outof which it arises.
The prejudicial character of understanding means that, whenever weunderstand, we are involved in a dialogue that encompasses both ourown self-understanding and our understanding of the matter atissue. In the dialogue of understanding our prejudices come to thefore, both inasmuch as they play a crucial role in opening up what isto be understood, and inasmuch as they themselves become evident inthat process. As our prejudices thereby become apparent to us, so theycan also become the focus of questioning in their own turn. WhileGadamer has claimed that temporal distance can play auseful role in enabling us better to identify those prejudices thatexercise a problematic influence on understanding (Gadameracknowledges that prejudices can sometimes distortthe point isthat they do not always do so), it seems better to see the dialogicalinterplay that occurs in the process of understanding itself as themeans by which such problematic elements are identified and workedthrough. One consequence of Gadamers rehabilitation of prejudice is apositive evaluation of the role of authority and tradition aslegitimate sources of knowledge, and this has often been seen, mostfamously by Jrgen Habermas, as indicative of Gadamersideological conservatismGadamer himself viewed it as merelyproviding a proper corrective to the over-reaction against these ideasthat occurred with the Enlightenment. 3.2 The Happening of Tradition
Inasmuch as understanding always occurs against the background of ourprior involvement, so it always occurs on the basis of our history . Understanding, for Gadamer, is thus always aneffect of history, while hermeneuticalconsciousness is itself that mode of being that is consciousof its own historical being effectedit ishistorically-effected consciousness( wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewutsein ). Awareness of thehistorically effected character of understanding is, according toGadamer, identical with an awareness of the hermeneutical situationand he also refers to that situation by means of the phenomenologicalconcept of horizon( Horizont )understanding and interpretation thus alwaysoccurs from within a particular horizon that isdetermined by our historically-determined situatedness. Understandingis not, however, imprisoned within the horizon of itssituationindeed, the horizon of understanding is neither staticnor unchanging (it is, after all, always subject to the effects ofhistory). Just as our prejudices are themselves brought into questionin the process of understanding, so, in the encounter with another, isthe horizon of our own understanding susceptible to change.
Gadamer views understanding as a matter of negotiation between oneselfand ones partner in the hermeneutical dialogue such that the processof understanding can be seen as a matter of coming to anagreement about the matter at issue. Coming to such anagreement means establishing a common framework orhorizon and Gadamer thus takes understanding to be aprocess of the fusion of horizons( Horizontverschmelzung ). In phenomenology, thehorizon is, in general terms, that larger context ofmeaning in which any particular meaningful presentation issituated. Inasmuch as understanding is taken to involve afusion of horizons, then so it always involves theformation of a new context of meaning that enables integration of whatis otherwise unfamiliar, strange or anomalous. In this respect, allunderstanding involves a process of mediation and dialogue betweenwhat is familiar and what is alien in which neither remainsunaffected. This process of horizonal engagement is an ongoing onethat never achieves any final completion or completeelucidationmoreover, inasmuch as our own history and traditionis itself constitutive of our own hermeneutic situation as well asbeing itself constantly taken up in the process of understanding, soour historical and hermeneutic situation can never be made completelytransparent to us. As a consequence, Gadamer explicitly takes issuewith the Hegelian philosophy of reflection that aims atjust such completion and transparency.
In contrast with the traditional hermeneutic account, Gadamer thusadvances a view of understanding that rejects the idea of understandingas achieved through gaining access to some inner realm of subjectivemeaning. Moreover, since understanding is an ongoing process, ratherthan something that is ever completed, so he also rejects the idea thatthere is any final determinacy to understanding. It is on this basisthat Gadamer argues against there being any method or technique forachieving understanding or arriving at truth. The search for amethodology for the Geisteswissenschaften that would placethem on a sound footing alongside the sciences of nature (the Naturwissenschaften )a search that had characterizedmuch previous hermeneutical inquiryis thus shown to befundamentally misguided. Not only is there no methodology thatdescribes the means by which to arrive at an understanding of thehuman or the historical, but neither is there any such methodologythat is adequate to the understanding of the non-human or thenatural. Gadamers conception of understanding as not reducible tomethod or technique, along with his insistence of understanding as anongoing process that has no final completion, not only invitescomparison with ideas to be found in the work of the laterWittgenstein, but can also be seen as paralleling developments inpost-Kuhnian philosophy of science. 3.3 The Linguisticality of Understanding
The basic model of understanding that Gadamer finally arrives at in Truth and Method is that of conversation. A conversationinvolves an exchange between conversational partners that seeksagreement about some matter at issue; consequently, such an exchangeis never completely under the control of either conversationalpartner, but is rather determined by the matter at issue. Conversationalways takes place in language and similarly Gadamer viewsunderstanding as always linguistically mediated. Since bothconversation and understanding involve coming to an agreement, soGadamer argues that all understanding involves something like a commonlanguage, albeit a common language that is itself formed in theprocess of understanding itself. In this sense, all understanding is,according to Gadamer, interpretative, and, insofar as allinterpretation involves the exchange between the familiar and thealien, so all interpretation is also translative. Gadamers commitmentto the linguisticality of understanding also commits him to a view ofunderstanding as essentially a matter of conceptual articulation. Thisdoes not rule out the possibility of other modes of understanding, butit does give primacy to language and conceptuality in hermeneuticexperience. Indeed, Gadamer takes language to be, not merely someinstrument by means of which we are able to engage with the world, butas instead the very medium for such engagement. We arein the world through being inlanguage. This emphasis on the linguisticality of understanding doesnot, however, lead Gadamer into any form of linguistic relativism.Just as we are not held inescapably captive within the circle of ourprejudices, or within the effects of our history, neither are we heldcaptive within language. Language is that within which anything thatis intelligible can be comprehended, it is also that within which weencounter ourselves and others. In this respect, language is itselfunderstood as essentially dialogue or conversation. Like Wittgenstein,as well as Davidson, Gadamer thus rejects the idea of such a thing asa private languagelanguage always involves others,just as it always involves the world.
Gadamer claims that language is the universal horizon of hermeneuticexperience; he also claims that the hermeneutic experience is itselfuniversal. This is not merely in the sense that the experience ofunderstanding is familiar or ubiquitous. The universality ofhermeneutics derives from the existential claim for hermeneutics thatHeidegger advanced in the 1920s and that Gadamer made into a centralidea in his own thinking. Hermeneutics concerns our fundamental modeof being in the world and understanding is thus the basic phenomenonin our existence. We cannot go back behindunderstanding, since to do so would be to suppose that there was amode of intelligibility that was prior to understanding. Hermeneuticsthus turns out to be universal, not merely in regard to knowledge,whether in the human sciences or elsewhere, but to allunderstanding and, indeed, to philosophy itself. Philosophy is, inits essence, hermeneutics. Gadamers claim for the universality ofhermeneutics was one of the explicit points at issue in the debatebetween Gadamer and Habermas (see Ormiston Schrift [eds.] 1990);it can also be seen as, in a certain sense, underlying the engagementbetween Gadamer and Derrida (see Michelfelder Palmer [eds.]1989), although in Derridas case this consisted in a denial of theprimacy of understanding, and the possibility of agreement, on whichhermeneutics itself rests. 4. Philosophy and the History of Philosophy
Gadamers commitment to the historically conditioned character ofunderstanding, coupled with the hermeneutic imperative that we engagewith our historical situatedness, means that he takes philosophy toitself stand in a critical relation to the history of philosophy.Gadamers own thought certainly reflects a hermeneutical commitment toboth philosophical dialogue and historical engagement. His publicdebates with contemporary figures such as Habermas and Derrida,although they have not always lived up to Gadamers own ideals ofhermeneutic dialogue (at least not in respect of Derrida), haveprovided clear evidence of Gadamers own commitment to such engagement.The dialogue with philosophy and its history also makes up a large partof Gadamers published work and, while that dialogue has encompassed arange of thinkers, its primary focus has been on Plato, Aristotle,Hegel and Heidegger.
In the case of Plato and Aristotle (see Gadamer 1980, 1986a, 1991),Gadamer has argued for a particular way of reading both thinkers thatattends to the character of their texts, that takes those texts todisplay a high degree of consistency, and that, particularly in thelater work, also views Plato and Aristotle as holding essentiallysimilar views. In The Beginning of Philosophy (1997a),Gadamer also takes Plato and Aristotle as providing the indispensablepoint of entry to an understanding of Pre-Socratic thought. When itcomes to Hegel (see Gadamer 1971), although there is much thatGadamer finds sympathetic to his own hermeneutic project (particularlyHegels attempt to move beyond the dichotomy of subject and object, aswell as aspects of Hegels revival of ancient dialectic), Gadamerscommitment to a hermeneutics of finitude (and so to what Hegel termsbad infinity) places him in direct opposition to theHegelian philosophy of reflection that aims at totality andcompletion. It is with Heidegger, however, that Gadamer had his mostsignificant, sustained and yet also most problematic philosophicalengagement (see especially Gadamer 1994a). Although Gadameremphasized the continuities between his own work and that ofHeidegger, and was clearly gratified by those occasions when Heideggergave his approval to Gadamers work, he can also be seen as involvedin a subtle reworking of Heideggers ideas. On a number of points,that reworking has a rather different character from that which isexplicit in Heidegger. In particular, Gadamer argues that Heideggersattempts, in his later thinking, to find anon-metaphysical path of thought led Heidegger into asituation in which he experienced a lack of (or need for)language (a Sprachnot ). Gadamers ownwork can thus be seen as an attempt to take up the path of Heideggerslater thought in a way that does not abandon, but rather attempts towork with our existing language. Similarly, while Heidegger views thehistory of philosophy as characterized by a forgettingof beinga forgetting that is inaugurated by PlatoGadamer takesthe history of philosophy to have no such tendency. In this respect,many of the differences between Gadamer and Heidegger become clearestin their differing readings of the philosophical tradition, as well asin their approaches to poets such as Hlderlin. 5. Literature and Art
The engagement with literature and art has been a continuing featurethroughout Gadamers life and work and, in particular, Gadamer haswritten extensively on poets such as Celan, Goethe, Hlderlin,and Rilke (see especially Gadamer 1994b, 1997c). Gadamers engagementwith art is strongly influenced by his dialogue with the history ofphilosophy, and he draws explicitly on Hegel as well as Plato. At thesame time, that engagement provides an exemplification of Gadamershermeneutics as well as a means to develop it further, while hishermeneutic approach to art itself constitutes a rethinking ofaesthetics through the integration of aesthetics into hermeneutics. Incontrast to much contemporary aesthetics, Gadamer takes the experienceof beauty to be central to an understanding of the nature of art andin the final pages of Truth and Method , he discusses thebeautiful as that which is self-evidently present to us (asradiant) exploring also the close relationship betweenthe beautiful and the true. Of particular importance in his writingabout art and literature are the three ideas that appear in thesubtitle to The Relevance of the Beautiful (1986b): artas play, symbol and festival. The role of play is a central notion inGadamers hermeneutic thinking generally, providing the basis forGadamers account of the experience both of art and understanding (see Aesthetics and Subjectivism above). The symbolic character of the artwork is seen, by Gadamer,not in terms of any form of simple representationalism,but instead in terms of the character of art as always showingsomething more than is literally present to us in the work (thisaspect of art as referring outside itself is also taken up by Gadamerelsewhere in relation to the character of art asimitation mimesis ). The artwork, no matterwhat its medium, opens up, through its symbolic character, a space inwhich both the world, and our own being in the world, are brought tolight as a single, but inexhaustibly rich totality. In the experienceof art, we are not merely given a moment of vision, butare able to dwell along with the work in a way thattakes us out of ordinary time into what Gadamer callsfulfilled or autonomous time. Thus the artworkhas a festive, as well as symbolic and playful character, since thefestival similarly takes us out of ordinary time, while also openingus up to the true possibility of community. 6. Practical Philosophy
Gadamers emphasis on application in understanding already impliesthat all understanding has a practical orientation in the sense ofbeing determined by our contemporary situation. Gadamer has himselfengaged, however, in more direct reflection on a range of contemporaryissues (see Gadamer 1976a, 1989a, 1993b, 1998b, 1999, 2001, see alsoKrajewski 2003). Much of Gadamers discussion of these issues dependsupon the hermeneutic ideas he has worked out elsewhere. A centralconcern in many of Gadamers essays is the role of Europe, andEuropean culture, in the contemporary worldsomething that wasespecially pressing for Gadamer with the advent of Germanreunification and the expansion of the European community (seeespecially Gadamer 1989a). Here, however, a number of other closelyconnected issues also come into view: the nature and role of modernscience and technology (see especially 1976a, 1998b), and togetherwith this, the role of the humanities; the question of education and,in particular, of humanistic education (1992); the issue ofunderstanding between cultures, and especially between religions. Inaddition, Gadamer has written on matters concerning law, ethics, thechanging character of the modern university, the connection betweenphilosophy and politics, and the nature of medical practice and theconcept of health (see especially Gadamer 1993b).
In almost all of these areas, Gadamers approach is characterized,not by the attempt to apply any pre-existing theory to the domain inquestion, but rather by the attempt to think from within that domain,and in a way that is attentive to it. As Gadamer comments in Truthand Method , application is neither a subsequent nor merelyan occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, butco-determines it as a whole from the beginning (Gadamer 1989b,324). Theory and application do not occur, then, in separation fromone another, but are part of a single hermeneuticalpractice.
Gadamers interest in practical philosophy has been reflected inthe way his work has itself been taken up within many otherdomainswithin, for instance, medical practice (e.g., Svenaues2003), intercultural studies (e.g., Garfield 2002, Lammi 2008)),education (e.g., Fairfield 2012), environmental education and ecology(e.g., Grn 2005), literary studies (e.g., Weinsheimer 1991),architecture (e.g., Snodgrass and Coyne 2006), law (e.g., Mootz 2007(Other Internet Resources)), and also theology (e.g., Lawrence2002on all of these topics, see also the various chapters inSection V of Malpas Gander 2014). Bibliography
An extensive bibliography of Gadamers work, compiled by Richard E.Palmer, can be found in Hahn 1997, 555602; Palmers bibliography isessentially a simplified version of Makita 1995. Primary Sources Works in German
19851995, Gesammelte Werke , 10 vols., Tbingen:J.C.B. Mohr; Truth and Method ( Wahrheit und Methode:Grundzge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik , 5th edn, 1975),is included as v.1; a list of contents for all 10 vols. is included invol.10.
19671979, Kleine Schriften , 4 vols, Tbingen:Mohr.
Other works not included in the Gesammelte Werke or KleineShriften :
1971, Hegels Dialektik , Tbingen: Mohr, Englishtrans. Gadamer 1976b.
1976a, Vernunft im Zeitalter der Wissenschaft:Aufstze , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, English trans. Gadamer 1981.
1989a, Das Erbe Europas: Beitrge , Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, English translation in Gadamer 1992
1993a, Hermeneutik, sthetik, Praktische Philosophie:Hans-Georg Gadamer im Gesprch , ed. by Carsten Dutt,Heidelberg: Universittsverlag C. Winter, English trans. Gadamer2001.
1993b, ber die Verborgenheit der Gesundheit:Aufstze und Vortrge , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag,English translation Gadamer 1996.
1997a, Der Anfang der Philosophie , Stuttgart: Reclam,English trans. Gadamer 1998a
2000, Hermeneutische Entwrfe , Tbingen: MohrSiebeck. Works in English
1976b, Hegels Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies ,trans. by P. Christopher Smith (from Gadamer 1971), New Haven: YaleUniversity Press.
1976c, Philosophical Hermeneutics , ed. and trans. byDavid E. Linge, Berkeley: University of California Press; 2nd revisededition published as 30th Anniversary Edition,2008.
1980, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies onPlato , trans. and ed. by P. Christopher Smith, New Haven: YaleUniversity Press.
1981, Reason in the Age of Science , trans. by Frederick G.Lawrence, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
1985, Philosophical Apprenticeships , trans. by Robert R.Sullivan, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
1986a, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-AristotelianPhilosophy , trans. P. Christopher Smith, New Haven: YaleUniversity Press.
1986b, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays ,trans. by N. Walker, ed. by R. Bernasconi, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
1989b, Truth and Method , 2nd rev. edn. (1st English edn,1975, trans. by W, Glen-Doepel, ed. by John Cumming and GarretBarden), revised translation by J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall, NewYork: Crossroad. [Since the appearance of the 2nd revised edition in1989, Truth and Method has been republished in variousformats by Continuum, and more recently Bloomsbury, withoutsubstantive change to the text, but unfortunately without maintainingany uniformity of pagination.]
1991, Platos dialectical ethics: phenomenologicalinterpretations relating to the Philebus , trans. by R. M.Wallace, New Haven: Yale University Press.
1992, Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry and History:Applied Hermeneutics , ed. by Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson,trans. by Lawrence Schmidt and Monica Ruess, Albany, NY: SUNYPress.
1994a, Heideggers ways , trans. by John W. Staley, Albany,NY: SUNY Press.
1994b, Literature and Philosophy in Dialogue: Essays in GermanLiterary Theory , trans. By Robert H. Paslick, ed. by Dennis J.Schmidt, Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
1996, The Enigma of Health: The Art of Healing in a ScientificAge , trans. by John Gaiger and Nicholas Walker, Oxford: PolityPress.
1997b, Reflections on my Philosophical Journey,trans. by Richard E. Palmer, in Hahn (ed.) 1997.
1997c, Gadamer on Celan: Who Am I and Who AreYou? and Other Essays , trans. and ed. by Richard Heinemannand Bruce Krajewski, Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
1998a, The Beginning of Philosophy , trans. by Rod Coltman,New York: Continuum.
1998b, Praise of Theory , trans. by Chris Dawson, NewHaven: Yale University Press.
1999, Hermeneutics, Religion and Ethics , trans. by JoelWeinsheimer, New Haven: Yale University Press.
2001, Gadamer in Conversation , trans. by Richard Palmer(from Gadamer 1993a), New Haven: Yale University Press.
2002, The Beginning of Knowledge , trans. by Rod Coltman,New York: Continuum.
2003, A Century of Philosophy: a conversation with RicardoDottori , trans. by Rod Coltman and Sigrid Koepke, New York:Continuum.
2007, The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the LaterWritings , ed. by Jean Grondin, trans. by Richard Palmer,Chicago: Northwestern University Press.
2016, Hermeneutics between History and Philosophy: TheSelected Writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer , ed. Pol Vandevelde andArun Iyer, London: Bloomsbury.
2016, with Jacques Derrida and PhilippeLacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics. TheHeidelberg Conference , trans. Mireille Calle-Gruber, ed. JeffFort, Fordham: Fordham University Press. Secondary Sources (in English)
Arthos, John, 2013, Gadamers Poetics: A Critique ofModern Aesthetics , London: Bloomsbury.
Barthold, Lauren Swayne, 2010, Gadamers DialecticalHermeneutics , Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2010.
Brandom, Robert, 2002, Tales of the Mighty Dead: HistoricalEssays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality , Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press.
Carr, Thomas K., 1996, Newman and Gadamer: Toward aHermeneutics of Religious Knowledge , New York: Oxford UniversityPress.
Code, Lorraine (ed.), 2003, The Feminist Interpretations ofHans-Georg Gadamer , University Park, Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press.
Coltman, Rodney R., 1998, The Language of Hermeneutics:Gadamer and Heidegger in Dialogue , Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Di Cesare, Donatella, 2013, Gadamer: A PhilosophicalPortrait , trans. Niall Keane, Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress.
Dostal, Robert J. (ed.), 2002, The Cambridge Companion toGadamer , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dottori, Ricardo (ed.), 2012, Fifty years afterH.-G. Gadamers Truth and Method: Some considerations onH.-G. Gadamers main philosophical work , Berlin: LIT Verlag.
Dworkin, Ronald, 1986, Laws Empire , Cambrdige, Mass.:Harvard University Press.
Eberhard, Philippe, 2004, The Middle Voice in GadamersHermeneutics: A Basic Interpretation with Some TheologicalImplications , Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Fairfield, Paul (ed.), 2012 Education, Dialogue andHermeneutics , London: Bloomsbury.
Foster, Matthew, 1991, Gadamer and Practical Philosophy: TheHermeneutics of Moral Confidence , Atlanta: Scholars Press.
Gander, Hans-Helmuth, 2014, Gadamer: the Universality ofHermeneutics, in The Routledge Companion toHermeneutics , ed. Jeff Malpas and Hans-Helmuth Gander, Abingdon:Routledge.
Garfield, Jay, 2002, Philosophy, Religion, and theHermeneutic Imperative, in Malpas et al .,pp. 97110.
Grondin, Jean, 2002, The Philosophy of Gadamer , trans. byKathryn Plant, New York: McGill-Queens University Press.
Grondin, Jean, 2003, Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography ,trans. Joel Weinsheimer, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Grn, Mauro, 2005, Gadamer and the Otherness ofNature: Elements for an Environmental Education, HumanStudies , 28: 157171.
Hahn, Lewis Edwin (ed.), 1997, The Philosophy of Hans-GeorgGadamer , Library of Living Philosophers XXIV, Chicago:Open Court, contains Gadamer 1997b.
Krajewski, Bruce (ed.), 2003, Gadamers Repercussions:Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics , Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.
Lammi, Walter, 2008, Gadamer and the Question of theDivine , London: Continuum.
Lawn, Chris, 2006, Gadamer: A Guide for the Perplexed ,New York: Continuum.
Lawrence, Fred, 2006, Gadamer, the Hermeneutic Revolution,and Theology, in Dostal 2002, pp. 167200
Makita, Etsura, 1995, Gadamer-Bibliographie (1922-1994) ,New York: Peter Lang (in German). (This is the definitive bibliographicsource for works by and about Gadamer; for corrections and additionsto this bibliography see the entry for the Gadamer HomePage in Other Internet Resources below.)
Malpas, Jeff, Ulrich Arnswald and Jens Kertscher (eds.), 2002, Gadamers Century: Essays in Honour of Hans-Georg Gadamer ,Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Malpas, Jeff, and Hans-Helmuth Gander (eds.), 2014, The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics , London: Routledge.(Includes entries on Gadamer as well as related figures andtopics.)
Malpas, Jeff, and Santiago Zabala (eds.), 2010, Consequencesof Hermeneutics: Fifty Years After Truth andMethod , Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern UniversityPress.
McDowell, John, 1996, Mind and World , Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press.
, 2002, Gadamer and Davidson on Understandingand Relativism, in Malpas et al ., pp. 173194.
McIntyre, Alasdair, 2002, On Not Having the Last Word:Thoughts on Our Debts to Gadamer, in Malpas et al .,pp. 157172.
Michelfelder, Diane. P. and Richard E. Palmer (eds.), 1989, Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Debate ,Albany, NY: SUNY Press. (Contains a number of Gadamers writingsrelevant to the debate with Derrida.)
Mootz, Francis Joseph, 2007, Gadamer and Law , Farnham,Surrey: Ashgate Publishing.
Ormiston, Gayle and Alan Schrift (eds.), 1990, The HermeneuticTradition , Albany: SUNY Press. (Contains a number of writings byGadamer and others relevant to the debate with Habermas as well asBetti.)
Palmer, Richard, E., 1969, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theoryin Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer , Evanston,Northwestern University Press. (One of the first detailed accounts ofGadamers thinking, and of hermeneutic theory generally, available inEnglish.)
, 2002, A Response to Richard Wolin onGadamer and the Nazis, International Journal ofPhilosophical Studies , 10: 46782. (A reply to Wolin 2000.)
Risser, James, 1997, Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other:Re-Reading Gadamers Philosophical Hermeneutics , Albany, NY: SUNYPress.
Rorty, Richard, 1979, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Scheibler, Ingrid, 2000, Gadamer. Between Heidegger andHermeneutics , Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
Schmidt, Lawrence K., 1985, The Epistemology of Hans-GeorgGadamer , Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
Silverman, Hugh J. (ed.), 1991, Gadamer and Hermeneutics ,New York: Routledge.
Snodgrass, Adrian and Richard Coyne, 2006, Interpretation inArchitecture: Design as Way of Thinking , London: Routledge.
Sullivan, Robert, 1990, Political Hermeneutics: The EarlyThinking of Hans-Georg Gadamer , University Park, Pennsylvania:Pennsylvania State University Press.
Svenaueus, Fredrick, 2003, Hermeneutics of Medicine in thewake of Gadamer: The Issue of Phronesis, TheoreticalMedicine and Bioethics , 24: 407431.
Wachterhauser, Brice, 1999, Beyond Being: GadamersPost-Platonic Hermeneutic Ontology , Evanston, Illinois:Northwestern University Press.
Warnke, Georgia, 1987, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition andReason , Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Warnke, Georgia (ed.), 2016, Inheriting Gadamer. NewDirections in Philosophical Hermeneutics , Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversity Press.
Weinsheimer, Joel, 1985, Gadamers Hermeneutics: A Reading ofTruth and Method , New Haven: Yale University Press.
Weinsheimer, Joel, 1991, Philosophical Hermeneutics andLiterary Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press.
Wiercinski, Andrej, 2011, Gadamers Hermeneutics and the Artof Conversation , Mnster: LIT Verlag.
Wolin, Richard, 2000, Untruth and Method: Nazism and theComplicities of Hans-Georg Gadamer, New Republic ,222(20): 3645. (See Palmer 2002 for a reply.)
Wright, Kathleen (ed.), 1990, Festivals of Interpretation:Essays on Hans-Georg Gadamers Work , Albany, NY: SUNYPress. Academic Tools How to cite this entry. Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society. Look up this entry topic at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entryat PhilPapers, with links to its database. Other Internet Resources
Gadamer Home Page in German maintained by Etsuro Makita
Gadamer Home Page in Japanese maintained by Etsuro Makita
Gadamer, Hans-Georg,entry by Lauren Swayne Barthold, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , J. Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.), U. Tennessee/Martin.
Hans-Georg Gadamer, by Robert Dostal, Oxford Bibliographies . Related Entries
Gadamer, Hans-Georg: aesthetics Heidegger, Martin hermeneutics phenomenology
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